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David Baltimore, David S. Tatel & Anne-Marie Mazza
Abstract: Formal opportunities for members of the scientific and legal communities to engage in ongoing 
collegial consideration of issues at the interface of science and law are limited. In the late 1990s, the Na-
tional Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine established the Committee on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Law (CSTL)–composed of equal numbers of members from science, engineering, and law–
to provide an ongoing forum that would build permanent links between these communities. The range of 
issues investigated by the CSTL and the influence of these explorations are discussed in this essay.
Scientists and lawyers often appear to be speaking 
different languages. Each profession has its own cul-
ture and conventions, as well as its own jargon, and 
each employs distinctive means of resolving con-
flicts.1 Often, when scientists and lawyers attempt 
to communicate, these differences can result in mis-
understandings and confusion.2 Moreover, when the 
institutions that represent these two professions at-
tempt to collaborate, the likelihood of such difficul-
ties can increase.
For almost two decades, the National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Commit-
tee on Science, Technology, and Law (cstl) has at-
tempted to bridge the divide between the legal and 
scientific communities by developing projects and 
reports that encourage insightful consideration of 
scientific findings by legal institutions and appropri-
ate oversight of the conduct of scientific, engineer-
ing, and biomedical research.3 This essay discusses 
the origin of the cstl and highlights some of the 
work the committee has undertaken to strengthen 
the bonds between science and law.4
The creation of a standing committee within the 
National Academies devoted to issues at the interface 
of science and law was not an easy decision. Many 
scientists within the National Academies viewed 
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the sometimes brutal adversarial nature 
of the exchanges among legal profession-
als as unsuitable for an institution devoted 
to the scholarly search for scientific truth. 
The National Academies’ mission of offer-
ing high-quality objective expert advice on 
some of the most pressing challenges facing 
the nation and the world seemed to some 
to be incompatible with the advocacy mis-
sion that animates much of legal discourse. 
When a need arose to address an issue per-
tinent to the legal profession, various com-
mittees of the National Academies would 
step up to offer advice on the particular sit-
uation, and then return to other issues fo-
cused more on scientific research than law.5
This ad hoc system of responding to is-
sues involving questions of both science 
and law began to change in the 1990s. The 
science establishment could not help but 
recognize that science and law were be-
coming increasingly entangled in both the 
conduct of science and the development of 
public policy. Increasing regulation of sci-
entific and academic research placed con-
straints on the conduct of scientific inquiry. 
Litigation was becoming more complex 
and often required testimony from sci-
entific experts. Attorneys specializing in 
certain areas of litigation like toxic torts 
sometimes interpreted data, like clusters 
of adverse outcomes, in ways that were at 
odds with the consensus of the scientific 
community. 
The legal system acknowledged the need 
for judges and attorneys to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of science 
when, in the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued several decisions instructing judges 
to play a more active role in deciding what 
expert testimony a jury could hear. In the 
1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that, 
in order to be admissible as evidence, sci-
entific testimony must be based upon cred-
ible scientific methodology.6 Judges were 
charged with conducting a rigorous assess-
ment of the validity of scientific testimony 
before they decided to allow it. In establish-
ing this standard, the Supreme Court quot-
ed a brief submitted by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and the American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Science as 
amici curiae: “Science is not an encyclope-
dic body of knowledge about the universe. 
Instead, it represents a process for proposing 
and refining theoretical explanations about 
the world that are subject to further testing 
and refinement.”7 The brief stated:
The scientific community’s well established 
criteria and institutional mechanisms for 
evaluating the validity of scientific assertions 
provide courts with clear and understandable 
guidance on how they can rationally and con-
sistently evaluate scientific evidence. Courts 
should admit scientific evidence only if it con-
forms to scientific standards and is derived 
from methods that are generally accepted 
by the scientific community as valid and re-
liable. Such a test promotes sound judicial de-
cision-making by providing workable means 
for screening and assessing the quality of sci-
entific expert testimony in advance of trial.8
Several years later in 1999, in Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether “technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge,” including testimony 
from the field of engineering, should also 
be evaluated for relevance and reliability 
in a manner consistent with the criteria of-
fered in the Daubert decision. In that case, 
the National Academy of Engineering sub-
mitted an amicus curiae brief stating: 
Engineering, although differing in many re-
spects from science, is founded on scientif-
ic understanding. In particular, the develop-
ment of detailed understanding of the caus-
es of the failure of an engineered device is a 
central feature of engineering: this effort in-
volves a scientific-style investigation to un-
derstand the mechanism of failure at a fun-
damental, quantitative level.
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In Kumho, the Supreme Court ruled that 
a trial court’s gatekeeping role extends to 
all expert testimony.
In light of their important role in these 
Supreme Court decisions establishing the 
standards of admissibility for scientific ev-
idence, the National Academies became 
more receptive to the establishment of 
an independent committee that could ad-
dress topics that required an understand-
ing of both science and law. The Academies’ 
leadership came to agree with many lead-
ers in the legal community (including U.S. 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen 
Breyer and U.S. Federal District Court Judge 
Jack Weinstein) that there would be an ever- 
growing need for the legal and scientific 
communities to work with each other on 
issues of importance to the nation. The 
need for a prominent forum for represen-
tatives of these communities to get to know 
each other, understand their cultures, and 
exchange ideas was becoming more and 
more evident. 
In March 2000, Donald Kennedy and 
Richard Merrill convened the Committee 
on Science, Technology, and Law, a new 
standing committee under the auspices of 
the National Academies of Sciences, Engi-
neering, and Medicine.9 Kennedy and Mer-
rill sought to bring together distinguished 
members of the science and law communi-
ties to stimulate discussions that would lead 
to a better understanding of the role of sci-
ence in legal decisions and government pol-
icies and to a better understanding of the le-
gal and regulatory frameworks that govern 
the conduct of science. At biannual meet-
ings, scientists and members of the legal 
community, including members of the le-
gal academy and judiciary, were encouraged 
to bring to the committee topics of nation-
al importance that would be best addressed 
from the perspective of both communities. 
Sessions at each meeting were built around 
controversial or emerging issues and often 
led to the development of project ideas for 
consensus studies and convening activities. 
At the time it was established, Kennedy and 
Merrill noted, the cstl could “not hope to 
canvass the entire terrain. Instead, we hope 
to become one of several contributors to the 
growing dialogue between science, engi-
neering, and law; a supporter of initiatives 
by other organizations; and a catalyst for 
promoting productive collaboration among 
participants from all affected disciplines.”10 
Eighteen years later, it’s probably fair to say 
that Kennedy and Merrill could never have 
envisaged either the wide range of topics 
the cstl would explore or the impact of 
these explorations.
In 2009, Kennedy and Merrill passed 
leadership of the cstl to Richard Meserve 
and David Korn, and in 2015, Meserve and 
Korn passed leadership of the committee to 
David Baltimore and David S. Tatel (coau-
thors of this essay).11 It is clear that the Na-
tional Academies’ and Kennedy and Mer-
rill’s decision to establish the cstl was pre-
scient. Many issues we face today, and will 
face in the future, require and benefit from 
the active engagement of both the legal and 
scientific communities. 
The pursuit of truth is a goal of both science 
and law. Science is almost always open-end-
ed: it is a process for investigating nature 
that reaches tentative interpretations based 
on the data at hand and subject to reinter-
pretation as continuing investigations gen-
erate ever more data that modify prior un-
derstandings or provide new insight. The 
law, too, requires constant refinement and 
reinterpretation. From both professions, 
society often demands that practical deci-
sions be made on the basis of incomplete in-
formation. Both scientists and judges seek 
explanations for phenomena to gain a bet-
ter understanding of a particular situation. 
The scientist seeks truth through an itera-
tive process wherein a hypothesis is posed, 
data are collected and analyzed, and new 
understanding is gained that then gener-
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ates new lines of inquiry. While this may 
appear to be a straightforward linear pro-
cess, in practice, science is often surpris-
ingly messy. Concurrent parallel lines of 
inquiry, collaborative exchange, and on-
going efforts to build a consensus through 
review and commentary on emerging re-
search are the norm. The result in the best-
case scenario is a transparent process that 
provides an opportunity for correction and 
refinement through peer review and further 
study. In science, evidence is continuously 
gathered, challenged, and refined until con-
sensus develops, though a degree of uncer-
tainty is associated with most scientific con-
clusions. The scientific community read-
ily accepts that today’s knowledge could 
be (and should be) revised if new data and 
findings lead to new conclusions. By con-
tinuing to collect evidence and test the lim-
its of theories, the scientific enterprise, by 
its very nature, is self-correcting.
Law also builds on the past, though 
change proceeds at a more deliberate pace. 
In interpreting the law and in some admis-
sibility decisions, precedent is given great 
weight, and judges typically do not have the 
option of postponing judgment until addi-
tional information emerges. In areas rang-
ing from climate and the environment to 
medical practice and pharmacology, regula-
tions and laws are written even though sci-
entific understanding may be incomplete 
and uncertain. Legal disputes must be re-
solved without delay based upon the data 
at hand, and the legal community must re-
spect legal conventions that may constrain 
the search for truth. As noted in Ethyl Corpo-
ration v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
We must look at the decision not as the 
chemist, biologist or statistician that we are 
qualified neither by training nor experience 
to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our 
narrowly defined duty of holding agencies 
to certain minimal standards of rationality. 
Although (our) inquiry into the facts is to 
be searching and careful, the ultimate stan-
dard of review is a narrow one. We must af-
firm unless the agency decision is arbitrary 
or capricious.12 
While relying on legal precedent estab-
lished by previous rulings may provide con-
tinuity, such precedent may impede consid-
eration of advances in science and technol-
ogy as they emerge outside the courtroom. 
The difficulty in reforming common legal 
practice became apparent when, in 2006, 
under the cstl’s auspices, a committee was 
appointed to undertake a congressionally 
mandated study of the forensic sciences in 
the United States. The committee–which 
was cochaired by Judge Harry Edwards, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, and Constantine Gat-
sonis, professor and director of the Center 
for Statistical Sciences at Brown University 
 –issued a landmark study in 2009 that 
found the forensic sciences to be systemi-
cally flawed. In reviewing the scientific un-
derpinnings of many forensic disciplines, 
the committee found a lack of rigorous 
scientific research and noted that “[w]ith 
the exception of nuclear dna analysis . . . 
no forensic method has been rigorously 
shown to have the capacity to consistently, 
and with a high degree of certainty, demon-
strate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.”13 This find-
ing undercuts decades of testimony by fo-
rensic experts who asserted that evidence 
associated with a crime scene could have 
originated with only one individual or ob-
ject, to the exclusion of all other persons or 
objects in the world.14 
For example, one of the forensic tech-
niques that the committee reviewed in de-
tail was forensic odontology, or “bite mark” 
analysis. Like many of the forensic scienc-
es, the criteria for evaluating bite mark evi-
dence were developed in the context of law 
enforcement investigations and not in sci-
entific laboratories. In 1974, three dentists 
testified that they could match bite impres-
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sions found on the body of an exhumed vic-
tim to a suspect, Walter Edgar Marx. Marx 
was convicted, and the decision was up-
held by a California appeals court in 1975. 
Despite the unprecedented nature of the 
claims, the California appeals court de-
clined to require a Frye hearing, since the 
techniques used by the dentists (for in-
stance, X-rays, models, microscopy, and 
photography) were well established.15 Since 
there was no scientific methodology or test-
ing of bite marks, nor any science connect-
ing an individual to bite marks, the court 
concluded there was therefore no need for 
such a hearing. Instead, the appeals court 
deferred to the trial judge who believed that 
bite mark evidence was sound. The Marx 
decision laid the foundation for the admis-
sion of bite marks into evidence and set a 
precedent that has influenced many courts, 
despite the fact that bite mark evidence has 
now largely been discredited. 
In conducting its review, the committee 
found that 
Although the majority of forensic odontolo-
gists are satisfied that bite marks can demon-
strate sufficient detail for positive identifica-
tion, no scientific studies support this assess-
ment, and no large population studies have 
been conducted. In numerous instances, ex-
perts diverge widely in their evaluations of 
the same bite mark evidence, which has led 
to questioning the value and scientific ob-
jectivity of such evidence.
Further, the committee noted that it “re-
ceived no evidence of an existing scientif-
ic basis for identifying an individual to the 
exclusion of all others.” Following such an 
assessment, one might expect that judges 
would no longer allow testimony that links 
a bite mark to a specific individual. Yet, to-
day, bite mark evidence remains admissi-
ble in some courts,16 although not in oth-
ers.17 The scientific community finds the 
resistance to change by the legal commu-
nity difficult to understand. Scientists are 
mystified when the courts resist embrac-
ing new knowledge that represents a scien-
tific consensus. It appears that the law has 
few systems designed to take advantage of 
the evolving nature of scientific knowledge. 
Judges seem to feel free to ignore scientif-
ic advances, especially in cases involving 
forensic sciences.18 Procedures to aid sci-
entific understanding in civil trials, such 
as Daubert hearings, appear to be far rar-
er in criminal trials, although the Court in 
Daubert was interpreting a federal rule of ev-
idence that is in theory equally applicable 
in civil and criminal litigation. Research is 
needed to understand the extent to which 
Daubert hearings are held in civil and crim-
inal cases. If there is a wide variation, it 
would be important to understand wheth-
er this is a failure of judicial education, or a 
reflection of a more systemic issue.19
Cases involving complex scientific evi-
dence can place great demands on judges. 
Most judges do not come to the bench with 
a strong background in science or technol-
ogy. Following the Daubert decision, judg-
es needed more information on how sci-
entists determine the validity of scientific 
assertions. In an effort to provide such as-
sistance, the Federal Judicial Center (fjc), 
the research and education agency of the 
federal judiciary, developed a series of ed-
ucational programs that allowed judges 
to interact with scientists to better under-
stand the culture, process, and methods of 
science. In 1995, the fjc developed the first 
edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence, in part in response to the Supreme 
Court’s Daubert decision. In order to satisfy 
Daubert’s reliability standards, the Supreme 
Court instructed judges to consider wheth-
er a proffered expert opinion was the prod-
uct of scientific reasoning and scientifically 
sound methodology. The chapters in the 
Reference Manual describe basic principles of 
major scientific fields from which legal ev-
idence is typically derived and provide ex-
amples of cases where such evidence was 
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used. The manual contains glossaries of 
technical terms that scientists may use in 
particular areas of scientific inquiry. 
The purpose of the Reference Manual is to 
provide judges with sufficient understand-
ing to hold an informed conversation with 
expert witnesses and attorneys while con-
sidering challenges to the admissibility of 
the scientific evidence. As noted in Lead In-
dustries Association, Inc. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency: 
[T]he court “must understand enough about 
the problem confronting the agency to com-
prehend the meaning of the evidence relied 
upon and the evidence discarded; the ques-
tions addressed by the agency and those by-
passed; the choices open to the agency and 
those made.” . . . However, it is appropriate to 
sound some notes of caution about the limits 
of this exercise. First, we would be less than 
candid if we failed to acknowledge that we 
approach the task of examining some of the 
complex scientific issues presented in cases of 
this sort with some diffidence. More impor- 
tant, we stress that our review of the evidence 
is not designed to enable us to second-guess 
the Agency’s expert decisionmaker. . . . Con-
gress has entrusted the Agency with the re-
sponsibility for making these scientific and 
other judgments, and we must respect both 
Congress’ decision and the Agency’s ability to 
rely on the expertise that it develops.20
Soon after the establishment of the cstl, 
the National Academies and the fjc rec-
ognized a unique opportunity to establish 
stronger ties between the scientific commu-
nity and the federal judiciary. The director 
of the fjc and the program officer oversee-
ing the Center’s studies on scientific evi-
dence were given permanent memberships 
on the committee. The fjc subsequently 
asked the cstl to collaborate on the devel-
opment of an expanded third edition of the 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. 
An advisory committee–cochaired by 
Judge Gladys Kessler, U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia, and Jerome 
Kassirer, professor of medicine at Tufts 
University, and including judges, scien-
tists, engineers, and medical professionals 
 –was charged with overseeing the develop-
ment of reference guides on thirteen scien-
tific, engineering, and medical topics. As in 
the previous editions, the guides were de-
signed to assist judges as they attempted to 
assess the scientific foundation of scientif-
ic testimony and, in the absence of a jury, 
to adjudicate on differing interpretations 
of scientific evidence. In addition to up-
dating previous guides, the expanded ver-
sion included new chapters on topics such 
as neuroscience, forensics identification, 
exposure science, and mental health. The 
Reference Manual is provided to more than 
three thousand federal judges and is also 
widely used by state judges, attorneys, and 
law professors. The National Academies 
makes the Reference Manual available for 
free to the public, and it has become one of 
the  forty most-downloaded reports of the 
over 9,900 reports issued by the National 
Academies, with 30 percent of the down-
loads coming from nations other than the 
United States. As Justice Breyer noted in the 
introduction to the volume, “This manual 
seeks to open legal institutional channels 
through which science–its learning, tools, 
and principles–may flow more easily and 
thereby better inform the law. The manu-
al represents one part of a joint scientific- 
legal effort that will further the interests of 
truth and justice alike.”21
Academic research in the United States 
is governed by a host of laws, regulations, 
and policies that provide oversight of scien-
tists and engineers who conduct research 
using taxpayer dollars. The cstl has eval-
uated numerous regulations and policies af-
fecting scientific research and research in-
stitutions. In its early years, the cstl be-
came interested in government policies 
affecting access to, and the use and evalua-
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tion of, research findings or scientific find-
ings relied upon by government agencies. 
Questions arose as to the applicability of 
Daubert to administrative agencies.22 This 
interest was stimulated by the Data Quality 
Act, which directed the White House Office 
of Management and Budget (omb) to de-
velop government-wide guidelines to “pro-
vide policy and procedural guidance to fed-
eral agencies for ensuring and maximizing 
the quality, objectivity, utility, and integri-
ty of information . . . disseminated by Fed-
eral agencies.”23 Companion guidelines in-
cluded in the omb Information Quality Bul-
letin for Peer Review provided guidance to 
agencies regarding how to conduct peer re-
view of the “most important science dis-
seminated by the Federal Government.”24 
Both the research community and feder-
al agencies expressed concerns, however, 
that the proposed omb guidelines would, 
in the name of quality and transparency, dis-
rupt scientific practice and would be used 
by special interest groups to contest the sci-
entific premises of government rules and 
regulations. To some, the Data Quality Act 
appeared to be a Daubert-like screening of 
scientific information and agency process-
es relied upon by federal regulatory agen-
cies.25 At the request of the omb, in 2002 
and 2003, the cstl convened a series of 
workshops where the affected communi-
ties (federal agencies, researchers, public in-
terest groups, and industry) could express 
their concerns to the omb. John Graham, 
the administrator of the omb’s Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs (oira), 
and several other omb senior staff attended 
these workshops. The exchange of informa-
tion during these discussions led to substan-
tive revisions to both sets of omb guidelines 
and an apparently greater understanding of 
the scientific process by the oira. 
Most recently, in 2016, the cstl issued a 
report entitled Optimizing the Nation’s Invest-
ment in Academic Research: A New Regulatory 
Framework for the 21st Century. The report was 
commissioned by Congress and authored 
by a cstl study committee chaired by Larry 
Faulkner, president emeritus of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin; Harriet Rabb, gen-
eral counsel of The Rockefeller University, 
served as vice chair. The report considers 
a broad range of regulations governing ac-
ademic research, from proposal develop-
ment to the acceptance of an award, to the 
conduct of research, to the final closeout 
of a contract or grant. The study recogniz-
es the importance of regulation in protect-
ing the government, research institutions, 
investigators, and the public from fraud, 
waste, and abuse, while providing an or-
ganizing framework for the conduct of re-
search. The report found that the increasing 
number of laws, regulations, and policies 
emerging over past decades have had the 
unintended negative effect of diverting sig-
nificant researcher time from research. In 
essence, the country is not reaping the full 
benefits from all the research it is funding: 
The continuing expansion of federal regula-
tions and requirements is diminishing the ef-
fectiveness of the U.S. research enterprise and 
lowering the return on the federal investment 
in basic and applied research by diverting in-
vestigators’ time and institutional resources 
away from research and toward administra-
tive and compliance matters. A new frame-
work . . . is needed to ensure that regulatory re-
quirements are justified, proportional to the 
problems being addressed, and harmonized 
across funding agencies so as to create a more 
effective and efficient partnership between 
funding agencies and research institutions.26
Among its many recommendations, the 
report called for the establishment of a Re-
search Policy Board as an “analytical, an-
ticipatory, and coordinating forum on re-
search regulatory policy.” This recommen-
dation, along with many of the committee’s 
other recommendations, was enacted with 
the passage of several laws, including the 
21st Century Cures Act (2016).27 
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The committee also called upon Con-
gress to appoint a national commission on 
human research subjects and recommend-
ed that the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services withdraw its Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking on the Federal Policy 
for the Protection of Human Subjects. The 
committee argued that since the 1978 issu-
ance of the Belmont Report, which articu-
lated three principles key to the protection 
of human beings used in research studies, 
the biomedical and sociobehavioral research 
enterprises have grown enormously. This 
growth, accompanied by the development 
of a remarkable number of new research ca-
pabilities and contexts, raises questions as to 
the optimum application and balancing of the 
Belmont principles, as well as whether these 
principles are, in and of themselves, still suf-
ficient pillars upon which to build human re-
search protection programs and regulations. 
In addition, the overarching legal and regu-
latory frameworks and institutional arrange-
ments governing human research subjects re-
quire reconsideration and clarification.28
While a commission has not been ap-
pointed and the final rule was issued in 
January 2017, it is important to note that 
newly issued federal policy reflects many 
of the committee’s concerns.29 Most no-
tably, it did not adopt a controversial pro-
posal to require researchers to obtain in-
formed consent to use unidentified bio-
specimens in research.
cstl activities demonstrate the impor-
tance and value of having the legal and 
scientific communities involved in the 
development of the legal and regulatory 
apparatuses that govern research and in 
discussions about how scientific research 
is conducted. A better understanding of 
both cultures affords the nation an oppor-
tunity to maximize the value of its con-
siderable investment in research for the 
benefit of the American economy and the 
health and social well-being of its citizens.
Regulation of emerging technologies has 
been of particular interest to cstl mem-
bers. The committee has convened meet-
ings on synthetic biology, gain of function 
research, neuroscience, and human ge-
nome editing, to name just a few topics. In 
the course of these explorations, it has be-
come increasingly clear that law and science 
speak only to some of the issues that arise, 
and that it is imperative to consider ethi-
cal frameworks as well. As emerging tech-
nologies become a more prominent part of 
public discussions, ethical, moral, and so-
cietal issues must be part of future public 
dialogues. 
We have also learned that it is necessary 
to expand our discussions beyond just the 
United States to include colleagues from 
around the world. At the behest of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (nas) and Na-
tional Academy of Medicine (nam), the 
cstl led the Academies’ collaboration 
with the Royal Society and Chinese Acade-
my of Sciences to organize an internation-
al summit on human genome editing.30 A 
new gene editing tool, crispr-cas9, cap-
tured the public’s attention in 2015 when 
it became known that this tool could be 
used to alter the human germline. The use 
of crispr-cas9 to edit human genes raises 
profound questions about the manner in 
which the dna of living beings may be al-
tered, as well as the genomes of future off-
spring. The two-and-a-half day summit, 
held in December 2015, received world-
wide attention, with representatives from 
more than twenty countries in attendance. 
The live webcast attracted more than three 
thousand viewers from seventy-one na-
tions. At the conclusion of the summit, 
the summit planning committee released 
a statement, “On Human Gene Editing”: 
It would be irresponsible to proceed with any 
clinical use of germline editing unless and un-
til (i) the relevant safety and efficacy issues 
have been resolved, based on appropriate un-
derstanding and balancing of risks, poten-
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tial benefits, and alternatives, and (ii) there 
is broad societal consensus about the appro-
priateness of the proposed application. More-
over, any clinical use should proceed only un-
der appropriate regulatory oversight.31
Recognizing that the human genome is 
“shared among all nations,” the statement 
called for “an ongoing international forum 
to discuss potential clinical uses of gene ed-
iting; help inform decisions by national pol-
icymakers and others; formulate recom-
mendations and guidelines; and promote 
coordination among nations.”32 Since the 
2015 summit, the nas and nam issued a 
consensus report, Human Genome Editing, 
that indicated that, in the future, clinical tri-
als for genome editing of the human germ-
line could be permitted, but only for serious 
conditions under stringent oversight. The 
report outlines several criteria that should 
be met before allowing such trials to go for-
ward.33 Other organizations have issued 
guidance as well.34 A second internation-
al summit co-organized by the nas, nam, 
the Royal Society, and the Academy of Sci-
ences of Hong Kong will be held in Hong 
Kong in November 2018.35
As the cstl continues to chart its course, 
it has identified several important topics 
where science, law, ethics, and interna-
tional engagement will play a critical role. 
In recent decades, major advances in neu-
roscience, psychology, behavioral econom-
ics, and related fields have expanded our un-
derstanding of human cognition and mental 
processes. This work has had wide-ranging 
significance in illuminating phenomena 
such as visual perception, memory, ratio-
nal choice, and decision-making. A 2014 
cstl report, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification, chaired by Thomas 
D. Albright, director of the Vision Center 
and Laboratory at the Salk Institute for Bi-
ological Studies, and Judge Jed Rakoff, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, synthesized and applied insights 
from this body of research to the topic of 
eyewitness identifications. The report dis-
cussed the scientific foundations of visual 
perceptual experience and memory, iden-
tified key factors that can lead to error, and 
offered recommendations for best practic-
es to improve the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification in criminal investigations. In 
2017, the U.S. Department of Justice issued 
new procedures for how the fbi and other 
law enforcement agencies should ask eye-
witnesses to identify suspects using photo 
lineups.36 
The related topic of unconscious bias 
has garnered much attention in light of 
well-publicized incidents of police use of 
force against minority citizens. While this 
is hardly the first time the issue has been 
at the forefront of national conversation, 
today we can engage in this conversation 
against a backdrop of over two decades of 
scientific research on the cognitive mecha-
nisms that underlie unconscious bias. The 
cstl envisions a study that recognizes the 
pervasiveness of unconscious bias as a com-
mon aspect of mental processing in a wide 
variety of contexts affecting a wide variety 
of groups. For example, recent studies by 
social psychologist Kelly M. Hoffman and 
colleagues have demonstrated that medi-
cal students and residents who held false 
beliefs regarding biological differences 
between blacks and whites (for example, 
that black people’s skin is thicker than 
white people’s skin) showed racial bias in 
the accuracy of not only their pain assess-
ments, but also their treatment recommen-
dations.37 In a separate context, then–act-
ing director of the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, in congressional testimony 
offered in 2016, described gender bias in 
federal hiring practices and identified un-
conscious bias as the most challenging bar-
rier to diversity and inclusion.38 
At a recent speech to incoming students 
at Georgetown Law, Associate Supreme 
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Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg ob-
served that, while many overt barriers to 
employment discrimination are gone, what 
remains is unconscious bias, which is hard-
er to address. Unconscious biases have pro-
found implications for efforts to increase 
diversity in hiring and promotion prac-
tices across all sectors of the economy, for 
criminal justice, and for decisions regard-
ing housing and finance.
Scientific understanding of unconscious 
bias has advanced considerably in recent 
decades, but this body of research has had 
minimal impact on law and policy.39 Some 
courts and judges have occasionally recog-
nized the reality of unconscious bias. As 
Justice Kennedy noted: “Recognition of 
disparate-impact liability under the [Fair 
Housing Act] also plays a role in uncover-
ing discriminatory intent: It permits plain-
tiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices 
and disguised animus that escape easy clas-
sification as disparate treatment.”40 None-
theless, there is no systematic or well-devel-
oped approach to how such biases should 
be taken into account under relevant legal 
standards.
The emerging body of research on un-
conscious bias has the potential to inform 
and motivate institutional reform in mul-
tiple environments. In police departments, 
universities, industry, and other settings, 
administrators are searching for ways to re-
duce unconscious bias not only to lessen le-
gal exposure, but also to achieve diversity- 
related objectives and to improve organi-
zational performance and credibility. By 
bringing the disciplined focus of science to 
bear on this critical issue, the cstl seeks 
to stimulate new conversations about the 
nature of discrimination and to identify 
ways to counteract ingrained unconscious 
modes of information processing. 
To take another example, the exploration 
of outer space has until recently been the 
exclusive domain of a few prominent gov-
ernments. Today, however, we are witness-
ing increasing interest in the exploration of 
space by emerging nations and nongovern-
mental entities. Scientific and technologi-
cal advances–such as the development of 
small satellites for research, communica-
tions, and remote sensing, and commer-
cial launch services–are rapidly changing 
access to space and expanding the scope 
of space activities. The diversification and 
growth of new actors and activities in space 
raise questions about the adequacy of ex-
isting laws, regulations, and policies. As re-
cently noted by Joan Johnson-Freese, 
Fifty years on, the Outer Space Treaty and 
its spin-offs are still appropriate. But inter-
pretations of its provisions are, more than 
ever, being influenced by commercial inter-
ests and politics. Supplementary rules and 
norms are needed. In an era in which inter-
national cooperation on treaties is tenuous, 
informal agreements and resolutions must 
guide space-faring actors, protect the envi-
ronment and prevent wars.41
The cstl sees this new era of activity in 
space as an appropriate time to explore and 
evaluate the adequacy of the legal, policy, 
and regulatory regimes governing the ex-
ploration and use of space. 
In this essay, we have taken the opportu-
nity to describe the history of the cstl, 
to provide some examples of the work the 
committee has done, and to identify areas 
of concern that will be the topics of study 
in the future. We have tried to illustrate 
the richness that emerges from thinking 
about the interface of science, technolo-
gy, and law. Interestingly, both science and 
law have the same property of never be-
ing fixed and complete. It is our hope that 
having members from the worlds of sci-
ence and law meet regularly provides a ven-
ue in which viewpoints are broadened on 
a range of issues, thus furthering under-
standing in both communities that extends 
beyond individual committee members. 
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As the knowledge of science and the pro-
cedures of law evolve, the need for this 
“cross-pollination” becomes ever more 
necessary. Thus, the work of the cstl will 
never be complete, and its particular con-
cerns will inevitably vary over time. 
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